Final risk analysis report for the release of *Puccinia spegazzinii* for the biological control of *Mikania micrantha*

May 2020



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Map 1 Map of Australia



Map 2 A guide to Australia’s bio-climatic zones

Map of Australia showing where the different climate classes are.
There are six climatic classes, these being:
- Equatorial
- Tropical
- Subtropical
- Desert
- Grassland
- Temperate


Acronyms and abbreviations

| Term or abbreviation | Definition |
| --- | --- |
| ACT | Australian Capital Territory |
| ALOP | Appropriate level of protection |
| BA | Biosecurity Advice |
| BCA | Biological Control Agent |
| BICON | The Australian Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment Biosecurity Import Conditions database |
| BIRA | Biosecurity Import Risk Analysis |
| CSIRO | Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| IPC | International Phytosanitary Certificate |
| IPPC | International Plant Protection Convention |
| ISPM | International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures |
| NSW | New South Wales |
| NPPO | National Plant Protection Organisation |
| NT | Northern Territory |
| PRA | Pest risk assessment |
| Qld | Queensland |
| SA | South Australia |
| SPS Agreement | WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures |
| Tas. | Tasmania |
| the department | The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment |
| Vic. | Victoria |
| WA | Western Australia |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

Summary

The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment has prepared this final report to assess the proposal by the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QDAF) to release the rust fungus *Puccinia spegazzinii* for the biological control of *Mikania micrantha*, commonly known as mile-a-minute weed, in Australia.

This final report recommends that the release of *P. spegazzinii* should be permitted, subject to standard quarantine conditions associated with the import and release of exotic biological control agents.

This final report has determined the overall risk associated with the release of *P. spegazzinii* to be Negligible. A risk estimate of Negligible achieves Australia’s appropriate level of protection (ALOP).

The assessment of risk to off-target plants included consideration of the testing methodology used and the plant species test list, including non-target species tested in described experiments. The biology of *P. spegazzinii* and the results of non-target testing carried out overseas prior to release of the biological control agent in several other countries was also considered.

*Puccinia spegazzinii* has been satisfactorily demonstrated to be highly host specific to *M. micrantha*. The proposed fungal agent is considered to successfully complete its life cycle only on *Mikania micrantha* and *M. cordata*, and no spore-producing lesions have been observed to develop on other tested non-target plant taxa.

This final report also contains details of the risk assessment process used for consideration of potential off-target effects associated with the proposed release of *P. spegazzinii*.

The application and supporting documents from QDAF that were provided to the department have been included with this final report (Attachment 1).

# Introduction

## Australia’s biosecurity policy framework

Australia's biosecurity policies aim to protect Australia against the risks that may arise from exotic pests entering, establishing and spreading in Australia, thereby threatening Australia's unique flora and fauna, as well as those agricultural industries that are relatively free from serious pests.

The risk analysis process is an important part of Australia’s biosecurity policies. It enables the Australian Government to formally consider the level of biosecurity risk that may be associated with proposals to import goods or biological materials into Australia. If the biosecurity risks do not achieve the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia, risk management measures are proposed to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. If the risks cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, the goods or biological materials will not be imported into Australia until suitable measures are identified.

Successive Australian Governments have maintained a stringent, but not a zero risk, approach to the management of biosecurity risks. This approach is expressed in terms of the ALOP for Australia, which is defined in the *Biosecurity Act 2015* as providing a high level of protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero.

Australia’s risk analyses are undertaken by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment using technical and scientific experts in relevant fields, and involve consultation with stakeholders at various stages during the process.

Further information about Australia’s biosecurity framework is provided in the *Biosecurity* *Import Risk Analysis Guidelines 2016* located on the [Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment website](http://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/risk-analysis/guidelines).

## This risk analysis

### Background

An application was submitted by the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QDAF) to release a biological control agent (Attachment 1). The biological control agent, *Puccinia spegazzinii*, is a rust fungus proposed for the biological control of *Mikania micrantha*. The applicant has followed the steps outlined in the [Biosecurity Guidelines](https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/risk-analysis/biological-control-agents/protocol_for_biological_control_agents) for the Introduction of Exotic Biological Control Agents for the Control of Weeds and Plant Pests.

*Mikania micrantha* is native to tropical America. It is a fast-growing invasive species, commonly known as mile-a-minute weed. Due to its invasive nature the weed has spread throughout countries in Asia and the Pacific, and is difficult and costly to control using mechanical methods or herbicides. *Mikania micrantha* has a limited distribution on mainland Australia (only present in Queensland), however due to the potential threat it poses to the Australian environment it is currently the target of a nationally cost-shared eradication program. It is also present in the Australian territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands. Christmas Island has been heavily impacted by the presence of this weed. This risk analysis does not assess the biosecurity risk associated with the release of *P. spegazzinii* for Christmas Island, Cocos Island or other external territories.

*Puccinia spegazzinii* is a rust fungus (Pucciniales: Pucciniaceae) which is native to South and Central America. Seven pathotypes of *P. spegazzinii* have been recognised, based on the characteristics of their infections of *M. micrantha*; these seven pathotypes have been further grouped into two ecotypes based on the characteristics of the environments from which they were isolated (Ellison et al. 2008). Of particular note are pathotypes IMI #393067, an Ecotype 2 member originally isolated from Trinidad and Tobago, and IMI #393075, an Ecotype 1 member originally isolated from eastern Ecuador.

*Puccinia spegazzinii* has been released as a biological control agent into nine countries including India (IMI #393067), and Taiwan, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Fiji, Vanuatu, Guam, Palau and the Cook Islands (IMI #393075). The rust has also been released in China.

Pathotype IMI #393075 is the subject of this application for release into Australia. The material proposed for release has been derived from infected *M. micrantha* plants sourced from Vanuatu, to where the rust was introduced from PNG in 2012 (Day and Bule 2016).

### Scope

The scope of this risk analysis is to consider the biosecurity risk that may be associated with the release of an exotic biological control agent into the Australian environment (excluding its external territories). The primary risk associated with a release of this nature is the possibility of unwanted off-target effects on other species already present in Australia. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment assesses the risk under the *Biosecurity Act 2015*.

Plants that are considered weeds are sometimes also considered to have value, for example, for purposes such as ornamental display, traditional medicine, feed for stock, etc. Considerations of the benefits, and therefore of any associated concerns about eradication of the target weed species are out of the scope of this analysis.

The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment will not commence an assessment to release a biological control agent unless the target has been approved by an appropriate government body. *Mikania micrantha* was approved as a target for biological control by the Australian Weeds Committee in April 2014.

### Associated pests

There are pests that may arrive with an imported exotic biological control agent. Section 9 of the *Biosecurity Act 2015* defines a pest as ‘a species, strain or biotype of plant or animal, or a disease agent, that has the potential to cause, either directly or indirectly, harm to: human, animal or plant health; or the environment.’ These pests may include, for example, parasitoids, mites or fungi. Should an application to release a biological control agent be approved, these pests will be addressed by existing operational procedures that apply to the importation and final release of the agent. These procedures include detailed examination of imported material, confirmation of identity, and breeding under containment conditions before release. For this reason, associated pests are not further considered in this risk analysis.

### Consultation

In September 2019, a preliminary draft of this report was distributed to state and territory departments of primary industry and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) through the Plant Health Committee (PHC), and also to the former Department of the Environment and Energy. There was no opposition to the release of *P. spegazzinii*.

On 13 December 2019, Biosecurity Advice 2019-P16 informed stakeholders of the release of a draft risk analysis report for the release of *Puccinia spegazzinii* for the biological control of *Mikania micrantha*. The draft report was released for a 60 day stakeholder consultation period (extended from 30 days due to the December/January holiday period) that closed on 12 February 2020. No stakeholder submissions were received.

# Assessment of off-target risks

This section sets out the assessment of off-target risks that could be associated with the release of the biological control agent. Where appropriate, the methods followed those used for pest risk analysis (PRA) by the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO 2019a), ISPM 3: *Guidelines for the export, shipment, import and release of biological control agents and other beneficial organisms* (FAO 2017) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO 2019c) that have been developed under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (WTO 1995). The methodology for a commodity-based PRA is provided in Appendix A.

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an ‘appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)’ as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. The ALOP for Australia, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 2.1, marked ‘very low risk’, represents the upper boundary of the ALOP for Australia.

The risk associated with the release of a biological control agent is a combination of the estimates of likelihood of off-target effects and the potential consequences of any off-target effects. A risk estimation matrix (Table 2.1) is used to combine these estimates.

Table 2.1 Risk estimation matrix.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Likelihood of off-target effects | Consequences of off-target effects | | | | | |
| Negligible | Very low | Low | Moderate | High | Extreme |
| High | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| Moderate | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| Low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk |
| Very low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk |
| Extremely low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk |
| Negligible | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk |

### 

## Stage 1: Initiation

Initiation commences when an applicant provides a submission proposing the release of a biological control agent. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment will not commence an assessment to release a biological control agent unless the target pest in the submission has been approved as a biological control target by an appropriate government body.

The risk analysis area is defined as all of Australia (excluding its external territories), given that once released there will be no control of spread of the agent other than environmental constraints related to the biology of the organism.

## Stage 2: Risk assessment

This assessment evaluates the likelihood of off-target effects and the potential economic and environmental consequences of any such effects.

The risk assessment is based primarily on consideration of the information provided by the applicant in the application package, including the results of host specificity testing, and current information in the scientific literature, where this is available. Given that the proposal is for deliberate release, the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread is assumed to be certain, and therefore the assessment relates to the host specificity of the proposed agent.

A likelihood is assigned to the estimate of occurrence of off-target effects. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible. Definitions for these descriptors and their indicative ranges are given in Appendix A, Table 1.

### Host specificity testing methodology

The following information regarding host specificity testing has been sourced from the application provided by QDAF (Attachment 1). For further details please refer to the application and its appendices.

In order to predict whether any non-target species would be at risk from the candidate agent, host specificity testing was conducted with *P. spegazzinii* (pathotype IMI #393075, sourced from infected plants from PNG) under contained conditions in Australia. The host test list consisted of 13 non-target plant taxa belonging to the tribe Eupatorieae and six species belonging to the tribe Heliantheae, and was based on the centrifugal phylogenetic method that places an emphasis on testing of species most closely related to the target (Briese 2005; Wapshere 1974). Each test species is known to be established in Australia, either as a native or introduced species (Table 2.2). *Mikania micrantha* plants used in the tests were grown from seed collected in north Queensland. Non-target plant species were obtained from a range of locations in Queensland. They were grown from seed collected in the field, propagated from cuttings from field plants, or obtained as whole plants from the field or nurseries.

Table 2.2 The plant host test list and the status of each taxon in Australia.

| **Tribe** | **Plant taxon** | **Status in Australia** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Eupatoriae | *Adenostemma lavenia* (L.) Kuntze | Native |
|  | *Adenostemma macrophyllum* (Blume) DC. | Native |
|  | *Ageratina adenophora* (Spreng.) R. M. King & H. Rob. | Introduced and biocontrol target |
|  | *Ageratina altissima* (L.) R. M. King & H. Rob. | Introduced and horticultural |
|  | *Ageratum conyzoides* L. subsp. *conyzoides* | Introduced and minor weed |
|  | *Ageratum houstonianum* Mill. | Introduced |
|  | *Bartlettina sordida* (Less.) R. M. King & H. Rob. | Introduced and horticultural |
|  | *Conoclinium coelestinum* (L.) DC. | Introduced and horticultural |
|  | *Eupatorium maculatum* (L.) | Introduced and herbal |
|  | *Gymnocoronis spilanthoide*s (D. Don ex Hook. & Arn.) DC. | Introduced and eradication target |
|  | *Liatris spicata* (L.) Willd. | Introduced and horticultural |
|  | ***Mikania micrantha* Kunth** | **Target weed** |
|  | *Praxelis clematidea* (Griseb.) R.M. King & H. Rob. | Introduced and minor weed |
|  | *Stevia ovata* Willd. | Introduced and minor weed |
| Heliantheae | *Calyptocarpus vialis* Less. | Introduced and weed |
|  | *Sigesbeckia orientalis* L. | Probably introduced |
|  | *Sphagneticola trilobata* (L.) Pruski | Introduced and minor weed |
|  | *Tithonia diversifolia* (Hemsl.) A.Gray | Introduced and minor weed |
|  | *Tridax procumbens* L. | Introduced and minor weed |
|  | *Xanthium occidentale* Bertol. (=*X. strumarium* L.) | Introduced and minor weed |

##### Host specificity tests

As described in the application, host specificity testing of *P. spegazzinii* in Australia used an eastern Ecuador pathotype (IMI #393075) imported from PNG on infected *M*. *micrantha* plants.

Testing was done on 20 plant species (including *M*. *micrantha*), using a similar method to that used by CABI UK (Ellison et al. 2008). In this method, within a plastic covered cage (400 x 400 x 900 mm high), at least 60 pieces of mature inoculum were placed on a wire mesh platform suspended over groups of 3 to 6 test plants interspersed with 3 to 6 *M. micrantha* plants (in general, the same numbers of *M. micrantha* and testplants were used), such that pieces of inoculum were directly over the plants below. Each plant species was tested at least 10 times, except for *Liatris spicata* (which was tested twice only); testing was done on a different plant of each species in each series of inoculations.

Trials were done in a controlled environment room (28°C/21°C day/night, 85% relative humidity (RH), 12 hour day/night light cycle). All plants and inoculum were sprayed to wetness with tap water using a hand-held sprayer and sealed in the cage, creating an environment in the inoculating cage of 100% RH. Based on Ellison *et al*. (2008), these conditions were considered the most conducive to obtain sporulation of the inoculum.

After 48 hours the inoculum was examined to ensure sporulation had occurred. All plants were then removed and placed in cages in a glasshouse (27°C/22°C day/night, 60% RH, ambient lighting) and examined three times each week for development of pustules (initially presenting as white chlorotic spots on leaves, and later as yellow pustules).

Test plants were held at least until pustules on *M. micrantha* reached maturity, that is, for at least three weeks. The applicants considered that this would have provided sufficient time for any signs of infection to appear, being at least 2 weeks longer than the time to appearance of first symptoms on the *M. micrantha* control plants.

Numbers of leaves infected, as well as numbers of pustules on each infected leaf were observed and recorded. Trials were considered invalid if more than one *M. micrantha* control plant did not develop pustules, or if there were fewer than 20 control plant parts (leaves, petioles and stems) infected and fewer than 50 pustules formed in total on the control plants.

### Host specificity testing results

In the 39 valid trials set up, all *M. micrantha* plants became infected. Only a small number (3) of the total of 211 *M. micrantha* plants used across all trials did not show signs of infection (Table 2.3), suggesting that each test plant should have been exposed to an adequate number of spores released from the inoculum. Eight trials were considered invalid due to low pustule development on the control plants.

The first signs of infection of *M. micrantha* (white spots on leaves, petioles and stems) occurred 7 days after exposure to inoculum, with pustules becoming yellow within 11 days. Mature pustules containing teliospores developed by 20 days.

The application states that:

The average number of all infected *M. micrantha* plant parts combined (leaves, petioles and stems) in each trial was 79.1±6.2 (n=39) and for individual plant parts: 54.0±4.0 (leaves), 21.1±2.2 (petioles) and 4.0±0.4 (stems). The average number of all infected *M. micrantha* plant parts combined per plant was 14.6±0.7 (n=211) and for individual plant parts: 10.0±0.4 (leaves), 3.9±0.3 (petioles) and 0.7±0.1 (stems).

The average number of pustules per trial for whole plants, leaves, petioles and stems was 491.1±88.7 (n=39), 417.5±75.4, 41.3±6.6 and 32.3±7.5 respectively. The average number of pustules per plant, on whole plants, leaves, petioles and stems was 88.1±9.3 (n=211), 76.5±8.0, 7.5±0.8, and 6.0±1.0 respectively. Infected *M. micrantha* plants were observed to have chlorosis of leaves around penetration, and curling and buckling of leaves, leaf wilting and leaf drop and some tip die-back, as the pustules matured. Under laboratory conditions and the inoculum load, no plants died during these experiments.

The applicants reported that no non-target test plants became infected or showed symptoms of infection (for example, a presence of white chlorotic spots or brown pustules) in any trial. Collated results of host specificity testing in Australia are reproduced from Attachment 1 in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Plant species used in host-specificity tests of *Puccinia spegazzinii*, and numbers of plants infected after inoculation.

| **Tribe** | **Plant taxon** | **Number of plants tested** | **Number of plants infected** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Eupatoriae | *Adenostemma lavenia* | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Adenostemma macrophyllum* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Ageratina adenophora* | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Ageratina altissima* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Ageratum conyzoides* L. subsp. *conyzoides* | 12 | 0 |
|  | *Ageratum houstonianum* | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Bartlettina sordida* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Conoclinium coelestinum* | 13 | 0 |
|  | *Eupatorium maculatum* | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Gymnocoronis spilanthoide*s | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Liatris spicata* | 2 | 0 |
|  | ***Mikania micrantha*** | **211** | **208** |
|  | *Praxelis clematidea* | 11 | 0 |
|  | *Stevia ovata* | 10 | 0 |
| Heliantheae | *Calyptocarpus vialis* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Sigesbeckia orientalis* | 13 | 0 |
|  | *Sphagneticola trilobata* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Tithonia diversifolia* | 12 | 0 |
|  | *Tridax procumbens* | 10 | 0 |
|  | *Xanthium occidentale* | 12 | 0 |

### Comments on host specificity testing

#### Australian testing

Host specificity testing in Australia used 19 non-target taxa. Each taxon is a member of the family Asteraceae, to which *M. micrantha* belongs, and is known to be established in Australia. Both native species belonging to the Tribe Eupatorieae (*Adenostemma lavenia* and *A. macrophyllum*) were included in the tests.

This host test list is representative of the most closely related plant taxa to the target species in Australia. By testing confamilial Australian species of increasing phylogenetic distance from the target species, the applicant is considered to have satisfactorily assessed the likelihood of off-target effects occurring in the Australian environment.

Furthermore, inoculations of tested plant taxa with *P. spegazzinii* occurred under optimal climatic conditions for the fungal pathogen, increasing the probability of infection of susceptible hosts. Each plant taxon, with the exception of *Liatris spicata*, was tested using at least ten replicate plants. These factors are considered to support a testing methodology of adequate rigour, and to be sufficient to address potential variation in non-target species responses to inoculation with the fungus.

As noted, *Mikania micrantha* was the only species observed to be susceptible to infection by *P*. *spegazzinii*. No non-target test species became infected or showed symptoms of infection.

#### Overseas testing

Prior to its introduction into Australia for host specificity testing, *P. spegazzinii* was tested in four countries, namely, the United Kingdom (on behalf of India and PNG), India, China and Taiwan, against a total of 274 species (including *M. micrantha*), representing 73 families, including 88 species in the Asteraceae, 22 species in the Eupatorieae and 12 species of *Mikania* (Attachment 1). These overseas test results form the bulk of the host specificity testing data for *P*. *spegazzinii*.

The primary host specificity testing results were reported by Ellison et al. (2008). Just over 60 test species were chosen using the centrifugal phylogenetic method, including ten other species of *Mikania.* In those tests a minimum of four replicates of each species was tested, and each species was tested twice. In addition to the *M*. *micrantha* control plants, *M*. *natalensis*, *M. capensis*, *M. microptera* and *M. cordata* became infected. For the most part those infections were abnormal, causing low numbers of smaller pustules with reduced numbers of teliospores (Ellison et al. 2008). In some cases, however, infections of *M*. *cordata* were comparable with those observed with *M. micrantha* control plants.

Ellison et al. (2008) also observed chlorotic spots on *Helianthus annuus* and *Eupatorium cannabinum*, and necrotic spots on two other unidentified South American species of *Mikania*. The leaves showing chlorosis were monitored through to senescence and no further symptom development was observed. Fu et al. (2006) found similar results with *Asparagus cochinchinensis, Eupatorium adenophorum, Elephantopus scaber* and *Helianthus annuus*, where chlorotic spots were observed, but no mycelia or haustoria could be found. Again, the chlorosis faded and disappeared as the leaves aged. Ellison et al. (2008) also noted a hypersensitive reaction on *Calendula* *officinalis* and *Stevia rebaudiana*, neither of which could be reproduced by Kumar et al. (2016). None of these plant species are therefore considered to be hosts of *P*. *spegazzinii*.

Further testing for purposes of release into India, Taiwan, Papua New Guinea and Fiji are summarised in Attachment 1. These results are all in agreement. The applicants have suggested that the combined scope of testing indicates that *P*. *spegazzinii* is the most widely tested weed biological control agent ever studied (Day and Riding 2019).

Minor infections by *P*. *spegazzinii* have also been observed on other species of *Mikania* in the field, most notably on *M*. *cordata* in Papua New Guinea (Day et al. 2013) following the agent’s release as a biological control agent. Farr and Rossman (2019) also list reports of *P*. *spegazzinii* on other *Mikania* species, but noting difficulties in the identification and taxonomy of *Mikania* species (especially in the absence of flowers) the reliabilities of these identifications are unclear.

Regardless, this field-derived information, combined with the observed glasshouse infections of *M*. *natalensis*, *M*. *capensis*, *M*. *microptera* and *M*. *cordata*, suggests that *P*. *spegazzinii* is likely to be able to infect some non-target *Mikania* species. Given that the only species of *Mikania* present in Australia is *M*. *micrantha*, and that the importation of exotic species of *Mikania* into Australia is prohibited due to their weed potential, the likelihood of *P*. *spegazzinii* having off-target hosts in Australia is assessed as negligible.

### Likelihood of off-target effects

The likelihood of off-target effects is determined on the basis of the host specificity testing and other relevant information presented in the application (Attachment 1).

*Mikania* is the only genus known to be a host of *Puccinia spegazzinii*. While chlorotic or necrotic spots have been observed on members of other genera in the Asteraceae, development of internal mycelia has never been seen. Thus, the fungus is only known to complete its lifecycle on *Mikania* species. *Puccinia spegazzinii* is also significantly more aggressive on *M*. *micrantha* than other *Mikania* species. *Mikania micrantha* is the only species of *Mikania* present in Australia, and all exotic *Mikania* species are prohibited from importation into Australia.

Hence, the likelihood of off-target effects of *Puccinia spegazzinii* in the Australian environment is assessed as: **Negligible**.

### Assessment of potential consequences of off-target effects

The potential consequences of the off-target effects of this biological control agent have been assessed using the same methodology (Appendix A) as used in the import risk analysis process for pests associated with imported fresh produce.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Criterion | Estimate and rationale |
| **Direct** | |
| Plant life or health | A—Indiscernible  There are no native *Mikania* species in Australia. In Australia there are two native species within the Tribe Eupatorieae (Asteraceae), as well as a number of introduced species. Host specificity testing and field observations in other countries demonstrated that *P. spegazzinii* only developed normal disease symptoms on *Mikania* species, almost exclusively on *M. micrantha*, but rarely also onother *Mikania* species not present in Australia and currently not permitted entry into Australia. No direct off-target effects on plant life or health of economic or environmental importance are expected to occur. |
| Other aspects of the environment | A—Indiscernible  There is no evidence that the introduction of *P. spegazzinii* would have any effects on any other aspects of the environment. |
| Indirect | |
| Eradication, control | A—Indiscernible  *Puccinia* *spegazzinii* is a biological control agent proposed for the biological control of *M*. *micrantha*. As there are no predicted off-target impacts of economic or environmental significance it would be very unlikely to meet the criteria for eradication. Therefore, the need for eradication and/or control is not anticipated. |
| Domestic trade | A—Indiscernible  *Puccinia* *spegazzinii* is a biological control agent proposed for the biological control of *M*. *micrantha*, a weed of environmental importance. Host specificity testing indicates that this agent is host specific, therefore *P. spegazzinii* is unlikely to impact on any other plant species to the extent that domestic trade would be affected. |
| International trade | A—Indiscernible  *Mikania micrantha* has no known economic benefit either in its native range or other areas where it is now established. *Puccinia* *spegazzinii* is a biological control agent proposed for the biological control of *M*. *micrantha*, a weed of environmental importance. No off-target impacts are expected to occur on any plants of significance to international trade. |
| Environmental and non-commercial | A—Indiscernible  *Mikania micrantha* is an introduced weed in Australia. The reduction of this species in the environment is not anticipated to have any negative indirect environmental or non-commercial effects. |

Based on this assessment the potential consequences of off-target effects are assessed as: **Negligible**.

### Off-target risk estimate

Unrestricted risk is the result of combining the likelihood of off-target effects with the outcome of potential consequences. Off-target effects and consequences are combined using the risk estimation matrix shown in Table 2.1.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Risk estimate for *Puccinia spegazzinii* | |
| Likelihood of off-target effects | Negligible |
| Consequences | Negligible |
| Risk | Negligible |

As indicated, the risk estimate for release of *Puccinia spegazzinii* has been assessed as ‘Negligible’, which achieves the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia.

# Recommendation on release

The overall risk estimate for release of *Puccinia spegazzinii* has been assessed as Negligible, which achieves the ALOP for Australia. Therefore, it is recommended that this biological control agent be permitted to be released, subject to standard import and release conditions to ensure that the released material is free of other organisms.

This recommendation is made on the basis of the high level of host specificity demonstrated by *Puccinia spegazzinii* on *Mikania micrantha*, and is based on currently available information.

# Stakeholder responses to draft risk analysis report

No submissions were received from stakeholders.

# Attachment 1

**Attachment 1** - Application for the field release of *Puccinia spegazzinii* de Toni (Pucciniales: Pucciniaceae) for the biological control of *Mikania micrantha* Kunth (Asteraceae) in Australia.

Appendix A: Method for pest risk analysis

This chapter sets out the method used for the pest risk analysis (PRA) in this report. The Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment has conducted this PRA in accordance with the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs), including ISPM 2: *Framework for pest risk analysis* (FAO, 2019a) and ISPM 11: *Pest risk analysis for quarantine pests* (FAO, 2019c) that have been developed under the SPS Agreement (WTO, 1995).

A PRA is ‘the process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it’ (FAO, 2019b). A pest is ‘any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products’ (FAO, 2019b). This definition is also applied in the *Biosecurity Act 2015*.

Biosecurity risk consists of two major components: the likelihood of a pest entering, establishing and spreading in Australia from imports; and the consequences should this happen. These two components are combined to give an overall estimate of the risk.

Unrestricted risk is estimated taking into account the existing commercial production practices of the exporting country and that, on arrival in Australia, the department will verify that the consignment received is as described on the commercial documents and its integrity has been maintained.

Restricted risk is estimated with phytosanitary measure(s) applied. A phytosanitary measure is ‘any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests’ (FAO, 2019b).

A glossary of the terms used in the risk analysis is provided at the end of this report.

The PRAs are conducted in the following three consecutive stages: initiation, pest risk assessment and pest risk management.

Stage 1 Initiation

Initiation identifies the pest(s) and pathway(s) that are of quarantine concern and should be considered for risk analysis in relation to the identified PRA area.

For this risk analysis, the ‘PRA area’ is defined as Australia for pests that are absent, or of limited distribution and under official control. For areas with regional freedom from a pest, the ‘PRA area’ may be defined on the basis of a state or territory of Australia or may be defined as a region of Australia consisting of parts of a state or territory or several states or territories.

For pests that had been considered by the department in other risk assessments and for which import conditions already exist, this risk analysis considered the likelihood of entry of pests on the commodity and whether existing policy is adequate to manage the risks associated with its import. Where appropriate, the previous risk assessment was taken into consideration in this risk analysis.

Stage 2 Pest risk assessment

A pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests) is the ‘evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences’ (FAO, 2019b).

The following three, consecutive steps were used in pest risk assessment:

#### Pest categorisation

Pest categorisation identifies which of the pests with the potential to be on the commodity are quarantine pests for Australia and require pest risk assessment. A ‘quarantine pest’ is a pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO, 2019b).

The pests identified in Stage 1 were categorised using the following primary elements to identify the quarantine pests for the commodity being assessed:

* identity of the pest
* presence or absence in the PRA area
* regulatory status
* potential for establishment and spread in the PRA area
* potential for economic consequences (including environmental consequences) in the PRA area.

#### Assessment of the probability of entry, establishment and spread

Details of how to assess the ‘probability of entry’, ‘probability of establishment’ and ‘probability of spread’ of a pest are given in ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c). The SPS Agreement (WTO 1995) uses the term ‘likelihood’ rather than ‘probability’ for these estimates. In qualitative PRAs, the department uses the term ‘likelihood’ for the descriptors it uses for its estimates of likelihood of entry, establishment and spread. The use of the term ‘probability’ is limited to the direct quotation of ISPM definitions.

A summary of this process is given here, followed by a description of the qualitative methodology used in this risk analysis.

##### Likelihood of entry

The likelihood of entry describes the likelihood that a quarantine pest will enter Australia as a result of trade in a given commodity, be distributed in a viable state in the PRA area and subsequently be transferred to a host. It is based on pathway scenarios depicting necessary steps in the sourcing of the commodity for export, its processing, transport and storage, its use in Australia and the generation and disposal of waste. In particular, the ability of the pest to survive is considered for each of these various stages.

The likelihood of entry estimates for the quarantine pests for a commodity are based on the use of the existing commercial production, packaging and shipping practices of the exporting country. Details of the existing commercial production practices for the commodity are set out in the report. These practices are taken into consideration by the department when estimating the likelihood of entry.

For the purpose of considering the likelihood of entry, the department divides this step into two components:

* **Likelihood of importation**—the likelihood that a pest will arrive in Australia when a given commodity is imported.
* **Likelihood of distribution**— the likelihood that the pest will be distributed, as a result of the processing, sale or disposal of the commodity, in the PRA area and subsequently transfer to a susceptible part of a host.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of importation may include:

* distribution and incidence of the pest in the source area
* occurrence of the pest in a life-stage that would be associated with the commodity
* mode of trade (for example, bulk, packed)
* volume and frequency of movement of the commodity along each pathway
* seasonal timing of imports
* pest management, cultural and commercial procedures applied at the place of origin
* speed of transport and conditions of storage compared with the duration of the lifecycle of the pest
* vulnerability of the life-stages of the pest during transport or storage
* incidence of the pest likely to be associated with a consignment
* commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during transport and storage in the country of origin, and during transport to Australia.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of distribution may include:

* commercial procedures (for example, refrigeration) applied to consignments during distribution in Australia
* dispersal mechanisms of the pest, including vectors, to allow movement from the pathway to a host
* whether the imported commodity is to be sent to a few or many destination points in the PRA area
* proximity of entry, transit and destination points to hosts
* time of year at which import takes place
* intended use of the commodity (for example, for planting, processing or consumption)
* risks from by-products and waste.

##### Likelihood of establishment

Establishment is defined as the ‘perpetuation for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry’ (FAO, 2019b). In order to estimate the likelihood of establishment of a pest, reliable biological information (for example, lifecycle, host range, epidemiology, survival) is obtained from the areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area can then be compared with that in the areas where it currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the likelihood of establishment.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of establishment in the PRA area may include:

* availability of hosts, alternative hosts and vectors
* suitability of the environment
* reproductive strategy and potential for adaptation
* minimum population needed for establishment
* cultural practices and control measures.

##### Likelihood of spread

Spread is defined as ‘the expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area’ (FAO, 2019b). The likelihood of spread considers the factors relevant to the movement of the pest, after establishment on a host plant or plants, to other susceptible host plants of the same or different species in other areas. In order to estimate the likelihood of spread of the pest, reliable biological information is obtained from areas where the pest currently occurs. The situation in the PRA area is then carefully compared with that in the areas where the pest currently occurs and expert judgement used to assess the likelihood of spread.

Factors to be considered in the likelihood of spread may include:

* suitability of the natural and/or managed environment for natural spread of the pest
* presence of natural barriers
* potential for movement with commodities, conveyances or by vectors
* intended use of the commodity
* potential vectors of the pest in the PRA area
* potential natural enemies of the pest in the PRA area.

##### Assigning likelihoods for entry, establishment and spread

Likelihoods are assigned to each step of entry, establishment and spread. Six descriptors are used: high; moderate; low; very low; extremely low; and negligible (Table 1). Definitions for these descriptors and their indicative probability ranges are given in Table 1. The indicative probability ranges are only provided to illustrate the boundaries of the descriptors and are not used beyond this purpose in qualitative PRAs. These indicative probability ranges provide guidance to the risk analyst and promote consistency between different pest risk assessments.

Table 1 Nomenclature of likelihoods

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Likelihood | Descriptive definition | Indicative range |
| High | The event would be very likely to occur | 0.7 < to ≤ 1 |
| Moderate | The event would occur with an even likelihood | 0.3 < to ≤ 0.7 |
| Low | The event would be unlikely to occur | 0.05 < to ≤ 0.3 |
| Very low | The event would be very unlikely to occur | 0.001 < to ≤ 0.05 |
| Extremely low | The event would be extremely unlikely to occur | 0.000001 < to ≤ 0.001 |
| Negligible | The event would almost certainly not occur | 0 < to ≤ 0.000001 |

##### Combining likelihoods

The likelihood of entry is determined by combining the likelihood that the pest will be imported into the PRA area and the likelihood that the pest will be distributed within the PRA area, using a matrix of rules (Table 2). This matrix is then used to combine the likelihood of entry and the likelihood of establishment, and the likelihood of entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood of spread to determine the overall likelihood of entry, establishment and spread.

For example, if the likelihood of importation is assigned a descriptor of ‘low’ and the likelihood of distribution is assigned a descriptor of ‘moderate’, then they are combined to give a likelihood of ‘low’ for entry. The likelihood for entry is then combined with the likelihood assigned for establishment of ‘high’ to give a likelihood for entry and establishment of ‘low’. The likelihood for entry and establishment is then combined with the likelihood assigned for spread of ‘very low’ to give the overall likelihood for entry, establishment and spread of ‘very low’. This can be summarised as:

importation x distribution = entry [E] **low x moderate = low**

entry x establishment = [EE] **low x high = low**

[EE] x spread = [EES] **low x very low = very low**

Table 2 Matrix of rules for combining likelihoods

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | High | Moderate | Low | Very low | Extremely low | Negligible |
| High | High | Moderate | Low | Very low | Extremely low | Negligible |
| Moderate | | Low | Low | Very low | Extremely low | Negligible |
| Low | | | Very low | Very low | Extremely low | Negligible |
| Very low | | | | Extremely low | Extremely low | Negligible |
| Extremely low | | | | | Negligible | Negligible |
| Negligible | | | | | | Negligible |

##### Time and volume of trade

One factor affecting the likelihood of entry is the volume and duration of trade. If all other conditions remain the same, the overall likelihood of entry will increase as time passes and the overall volume of trade increases.

The department normally considers the likelihood of entry on the basis of the estimated volume of one year’s trade. This is a convenient value for the analysis that is relatively easy to estimate and allows for expert consideration of seasonal variations in pest presence, incidence and behaviour to be taken into account. The consideration of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and subsequent consequences takes into account events that might happen over a number of years even though only one year’s volume of trade is being considered. This difference reflects biological and ecological facts, for example where a pest or disease may establish in the year of import but spread may take many years.

The use of a one year volume of trade has been taken into account when setting up the matrix that is used to estimate the risk and therefore any policy based on this analysis does not simply apply to one year of trade. Policy decisions that are based on the department’s method that uses the estimated volume of one year’s trade are consistent with Australia’s policy on appropriate level of protection and meet the Australian Government’s requirement for ongoing quarantine protection. If there are substantial changes in the volume and nature of the trade in specific commodities then the department will review the risk analysis and, if necessary, provide updated policy advice.

#### Assessment of potential consequences

The objective of the consequence assessment is to provide a structured and transparent analysis of the potential consequences if the pests or disease agents were to enter, establish and spread in Australia. The assessment considers direct and indirect pest effects and their economic and environmental consequences. The requirements for assessing potential consequences are given in Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement (WTO, 1995), ISPM 5 (FAO, 2019b) and ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c).

Direct pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

* plant life or health
* other aspects of the environment.

Indirect pest effects are considered in the context of the effects on:

* eradication, control
* domestic trade
* international trade
* non-commercial and environmental.

For each of these six criteria, the consequences were estimated over four geographic levels, defined as:

**Local**—an aggregate of households or enterprises (a rural community, a town or a local government area).

**District**—a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of aggregates (generally a recognised section of a state or territory, such as ‘Far North Queensland’).

**Regional**—a geographically or geopolitically associated collection of districts in a geographic area (generally a state or territory, although there may be exceptions with larger states such as Western Australia).

**National**—Australia wide (Australian mainland states and territories and Tasmania).

For each criterion, the magnitude of the potential consequence at each of these levels was described using four categories, defined as:

**Indiscernible**—pest impact unlikely to be noticeable.

**Minor significance**—expected to lead to a minor increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts or a minor decrease in production but not expected to threaten the economic viability of production. Expected to decrease the value of non-commercial criteria but not threaten the criterion’s intrinsic value. Effects would generally be reversible.

**Significant**—expected to threaten the economic viability of production through a moderate increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a moderate decrease in production. Expected to significantly diminish or threaten the intrinsic value of non-commercial criteria. Effects may not be reversible.

**Major significance**—expected to threaten the economic viability through a large increase in mortality/morbidity of hosts, or a large decrease in production. Expected to severely or irreversibly damage the intrinsic ‘value’ of non-commercial criteria.

The estimates of the magnitude of the potential consequences over the four geographic levels were translated into a qualitative impact score (A‑G) using Table 3. For example, a consequence with a magnitude of ‘significant’ at the ‘district’ level will have a consequence impact score of D.

Table 3 Decision rules for determining the consequence impact score based on the magnitude of consequences at four geographic scales

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Magnitude | Geographic scale | | | |
| Local | District | Region | Nation |
| Indiscernible | A | A | A | A |
| Minor significance | B | C | D | E |
| Significant | C | D | E | F |
| Major significance | D | E | F | G |

Note: In earlier qualitative PRAs, the scale for the impact scores went from A to F and did not explicitly allow for the rating ‘indiscernible’ at all four levels. This combination might be applicable for some criteria. In this report, the impact scale of A to F has been changed to become B‑G and a new lowest category A (‘indiscernible’ at all four levels) was added. The rules for combining impacts in Table 4 were adjusted accordingly.

The overall consequence for each pest is achieved by combining the qualitative impact scores (A–G) for each direct and indirect consequence using a series of decision rules (Table 4). These rules are mutually exclusive, and are assessed in numerical order until one applies.

Table 4 Decision rules for determining the overall consequence rating for each pest

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Rule | The impact scores for consequences of direct and indirect criteria | Overall consequence rating |
| 1 | Any criterion has an impact of ‘G’; or more than one criterion has an impact of ‘F’; or a single criterion has an impact of ‘F’ and each remaining criterion an ‘E’. | Extreme |
| 2 | A single criterion has an impact of ‘F’; or all criteria have an impact of ‘E’. | High |
| 3 | One or more criteria have an impact of ‘E’; or all criteria have an impact of ‘D’. | Moderate |
| 4 | One or more criteria have an impact of ‘D’; or all criteria have an impact of ‘C’. | Low |
| 5 | One or more criteria have an impact of ‘C’; or all criteria have an impact of ‘B’. | Very Low |
| 6 | One or more but not all criteria have an impact of ‘B’, and all remaining criteria have an impact of ‘A’. | Negligible |

#### Estimation of the unrestricted risk

Once the assessment of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and for potential consequences are completed, the unrestricted risk can be determined for each pest or groups of pests. This is determined by using a risk estimation matrix (Table 5) to combine the estimates of the likelihood of entry, establishment and spread and the overall consequences of pest establishment and spread. Therefore, risk is the combination of likelihood and consequence.

When interpreting the risk estimation matrix, note the descriptors for each axis are similar (for example, low, moderate, high) but the vertical axis refers to likelihood and the horizontal axis refers to consequences. Accordingly, a ‘low’ likelihood combined with ‘high’ consequences, is not the same as a ‘high’ likelihood combined with ‘low’ consequences—the matrix is not symmetrical. For example, the former combination would give an unrestricted risk rating of ‘moderate’, whereas, the latter would be rated as a ‘low’ unrestricted risk.

Table 5 Risk estimation matrix

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Likelihood of pest entry, establishment and spread | Consequences of pest entry, establishment and spread | | | | | |
| Negligible | Very low | Low | Moderate | High | Extreme |
| High | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| Moderate | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk | Extreme risk |
| Low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk | High risk |
| Very low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk | Moderate risk |
| Extremely low | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk | Low risk |
| Negligible | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Negligible risk | Very low risk |

#### The appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia

The SPS Agreement defines the concept of an ‘appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection (ALOP)’ as the level of protection deemed appropriate by the WTO Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.

Like many other countries, Australia expresses its ALOP in qualitative terms. The ALOP for Australia, which reflects community expectations through government policy, is currently expressed as providing a high level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing risk to a very low level, but not to zero. The band of cells in Table 5 marked ‘very low risk’ represents the upper boundary of the ALOP for Australia.

Stage 3 Pest risk management

Pest risk management describes the process of identifying and implementing phytosanitary measures to manage risks to achieve the ALOP for Australia, while ensuring that any negative effects on trade are minimised.

The conclusions from pest risk assessment are used to decide whether risk management is required and if so, the appropriate measures to be used. Where the unrestricted risk estimate does not achieve the ALOP for Australia, risk management measures are required to reduce this risk to a very low level. The guiding principle for risk management is to manage risk to achieve the ALOP for Australia. The effectiveness of any proposed phytosanitary measures (or combination of measures) is evaluated, using the same approach as used to evaluate the unrestricted risk, to ensure the restricted risk for the relevant pest or pests achieves the ALOP for Australia.

ISPM 11 (FAO, 2019c) provides details on the identification and selection of appropriate risk management options and notes that the choice of measures should be based on their effectiveness in reducing the likelihood of entry of the pest.

Examples given of measures commonly applied to traded commodities include:

* options for consignments—for example, inspection or testing for freedom from pests, prohibition of parts of the host, a pre-entry or post-entry quarantine system, specified conditions on preparation of the consignment, specified treatment of the consignment, restrictions on end-use, distribution and periods of entry of the commodity
* options preventing or reducing infestation in the crop—for example, treatment of the crop, restriction on the composition of a consignment so it is composed of plants belonging to resistant or less susceptible species, harvesting of plants at a certain age or specified time of the year, production in a certification scheme
* options ensuring that the area, place or site of production or crop is free from the pest—for example, pest-free area, pest-free place of production or pest-free production site
* options for other types of pathways—for example, consider natural spread, measures for human travellers and their baggage, cleaning or disinfestations of contaminated machinery
* options within the importing country—for example, surveillance and eradication programs
* prohibition of commodities—if no satisfactory measure can be found.

Risk management measures are identified for each quarantine pest where the level of biosecurity risk does not achieve the ALOP for Australia.

Glossary

| Term or abbreviation | Definition |
| --- | --- |
| Appropriate level of protection (ALOP) | The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory (WTO 1995). |
| Appropriate level of protection (ALOP) for Australia | The *Biosecurity Act 2015* defines the appropriate level of protection (or ALOP) for Australia as a high level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection aimed at reducing biosecurity risks to very low, but not to zero. |
| Australian territory | Australian territory as referenced in the *Biosecurity Act 2015* refers to Australia, Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands. |
| Biological control agent | A natural enemy, antagonist or competitor, or other organism, used for pest control (FAO 2019b). |
| Biosecurity | The prevention of the entry, establishment or spread of unwanted pests and infectious disease agents to protect human, animal or plant health or life, and the environment. |
| Biosecurity measures | The *Biosecurity Act 2015* defines biosecurity measures as measures to manage any of the following: biosecurity risk, the risk of contagion of a listed human disease, the risk of listed human diseases entering, emerging, establishing themselves or spreading in Australian territory, and biosecurity emergencies and human biosecurity emergencies. |
| Biosecurity import risk analysis (BIRA) | The *Biosecurity Act 2015* defines a BIRA as an evaluation of the level of biosecurity risk associated with particular goods, or a particular class of goods, that may be imported, or proposed to be imported, into Australian territory, including, if necessary, the identification of conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or the class of goods, to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia. The risk analysis process is regulated under legislation. |
| Biosecurity risk | The *Biosecurity Act 2015* refers to biosecurity risk as the likelihood of a disease or pest entering, establishing or spreading in Australian territory, and the potential for the disease or pest causing harm to human, animal or plant health, the environment, economic or community activities. |
| Control (of a pest) | Suppression, containment or eradication of a pest population (FAO 2019b). |
| The department | The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment. |
| Endangered area | An area where ecological factors favour the establishment of a pest whose presence in the area will result in economically important loss (FAO 2019b). |
| Endemic | Belonging to, native to, or prevalent in a particular geography, area or environment. |
| Entry (of a pest) | Movement of a pest into an area where it is not yet present, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2019b). |
| Establishment (of a pest) | Perpetuation, for the foreseeable future, of a pest within an area after entry (FAO 2019b). |
| Fumigation | A method of pest control that completely fills an area with gaseous pesticides to suffocate or poison the pests within. |
| Genus | A taxonomic category ranking below a family and above a species and generally consisting of a group of species exhibiting similar characteristics. In taxonomic nomenclature the genus name is used, either alone or followed by a Latin adjective or epithet, to form the name of a species. |
| Host | An organism that harbours a parasite, mutual partner, or commensal partner, typically providing nourishment and shelter. |
| Host range | Species capable, under natural conditions, of sustaining a specific pest or other organism (FAO, 2019b). |
| Infection | The internal ‘endophytic’ colonisation of a plant, or plant organ, and is generally associated with the development of disease symptoms as the integrity of cells and/or biological processes are disrupted. |
| Infestation (of a commodity) | Presence in a commodity of a living pest of the plant or plant product concerned. Infestation includes infection (FAO 2019b). |
| Inspection | Official visual examination of plants, plant products or other regulated articles to determine if pests are present or to determine compliance with phytosanitary regulations (FAO 2019b). |
| Interception (of a pest) | The detection of a pest during inspection or testing of an imported consignment (FAO 2019b). |
| International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) | The IPPC is an international plant health agreement, established in 1952, that aims to protect cultivated and wild plants by preventing the introduction and spread of pests. The IPPC provides an international framework for plant protection that includes developing International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs) for safeguarding plant resources. |
| International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) | An international standard adopted by the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures or the Commission on Phytosanitary Measures, established under the IPPC (FAO 2019b). |
| Introduction (of a pest) | The entry of a pest resulting in its establishment (FAO 2019b). |
| Larva | A juvenile form of animal with indirect development, undergoing metamorphosis (for example, insects or amphibians). |
| National Plant Protection Organization (NPPO) | Official service established by a government to discharge the functions specified by the IPPC (FAO 2019b). |
| Non-regulated risk analysis | Refers to the process for conducting a risk analysis that is not regulated under legislation (Biosecurity import risk analysis guidelines 2016). |
| Nymph | The immature form of some insect species that undergoes incomplete metamorphosis. It is not to be confused with larva, as its overall form is already that of the adult. |
| Pathogen | A biological agent that can cause disease to its host. |
| Pathway | Any means that allows the entry or spread of a pest (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest | Any species, strain or biotype of plant, animal, or pathogenic agent injurious to plants or plant products (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest free area (PFA) | An area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest risk analysis (PRA) | The process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest risk assessment (for quarantine pests) | Evaluation of the probability of the introduction and spread of a pest and of the magnitude of the associated potential economic consequences (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest risk assessment (for regulated non-quarantine pests) | Evaluation of the probability that a pest in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest risk management (for quarantine pests) | Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of a pest (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest risk management (for regulated non-quarantine pests) | Evaluation and selection of options to reduce the risk that a pest in plants for planting causes an economically unacceptable impact on the intended use of those plants (FAO 2019b). |
| Pest status (in an area) | Presence or absence, at the present time, of a pest in an area, including where appropriate its distribution, as officially determined using expert judgement on the basis of current and historical pest records and other information (FAO 2019b). |
| Phytosanitary certificate | An official paper document or its official electronic equivalent, consistent with the model of certificates of the IPPC, attesting that a consignment meets phytosanitary import requirements (FAO 2019b). |
| Phytosanitary certification | Use of phytosanitary procedures leading to the issue of a phytosanitary certificate (FAO 2019b). |
| Phytosanitary measure | Phytosanitary relates to the health of plants. Any legislation, regulation or official procedure having the purpose to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests (FAO 2019b). In this risk analysis the term ‘phytosanitary measure’ and ‘risk management measure’ may be used interchangeably. |
| Phytosanitary procedure | Any official method for implementing phytosanitary measures including the performance of inspections, tests, surveillance or treatments in connection with regulated pests (FAO 2019b). |
| Phytosanitary regulation | Official rule to prevent the introduction and/or spread of quarantine pests, or to limit the economic impact of regulated non-quarantine pests, including establishment of procedures for phytosanitary certification (FAO 2019b). |
| Polyphagous | Feeding on a relatively large number of hosts from different plant family and/or genera. |
| Practically free | Of a consignment, field or place of production, without pests (or a specific pests) in numbers or quantities in excess of those that can be expected to result from, and be consistent with good cultural and handling practices employed in the production and marketing of the commodity (FAO 2019b). |
| Pupa | An inactive life stage that only occurs in insects that undergo complete metamorphosis, for example butterflies and moths (Lepidoptera), beetles (Coleoptera) and bees, wasps and ants (Hymenoptera). |
| Quarantine | Official confinement of regulated articles for observation and research or for further inspection, testing or treatment (FAO 2019b). |
| Quarantine pest | A pest of potential economic importance to the area endangered thereby and not yet present there, or present but not widely distributed and being officially controlled (FAO 2019b). |
| Regulated article | Any plant, plant product, storage place, packaging, conveyance, container, soil and any other organism, object or material capable of harbouring or spreading pests, deemed to require phytosanitary measures, particularly where international transportation is involved (FAO 2019b). |
| Regulated non-quarantine pest | A non-quarantine pest whose presence in plants for planting affects the intended use of those plants with an economically unacceptable impact and which is therefore regulated within the territory of the importing contracting party (FAO 2019b). |
| Regulated pest | A quarantine pest or a regulated non-quarantine pest (FAO 2019b). |
| Restricted risk | Restricted risk is the risk estimate when risk management measures are applied. |
| Risk analysis | Refers to the technical or scientific process for assessing the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or the class of goods, and if necessary, the identification of conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods, or class of goods to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia. |
| Risk management measure | Are conditions that must be met to manage the level of biosecurity risk associated with the goods or the class of goods, to a level that achieves the ALOP for Australia. In this risk analysis, the term ‘risk management measure’ and ‘phytosanitary measure’ may be used interchangeably. |
| Saprophyte | An organism deriving its nourishment from dead organic matter. |
| Spread (of a pest) | Expansion of the geographical distribution of a pest within an area (FAO 2019b). |
| SPS Agreement | WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. |
| Stakeholders | Government agencies, individuals, community or industry groups or organizations, whether in Australia or overseas, including the proponent/applicant for a specific proposal, who have an interest in the policy issues. |
| Surveillance | An official process which collects and records data on pest occurrence or absence by surveying, monitoring or other procedures (FAO 2019b). |
| Systems approach(es) | The integration of different risk management measures, at least two of which act independently, and which cumulatively achieve the appropriate level of protection against regulated pests. |
| Treatment | Official procedure for the killing, inactivation or removal of pests, or for rendering pests infertile or for devitalisation (FAO 2019b). |
| Unrestricted risk | Unrestricted risk estimates apply in the absence of risk management measures. |
| Vector | An organism that does not cause disease itself, but which causes infection by conveying pathogens from one host to another. |
| Viable | Alive, able to germinate or capable of growth. |

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