



NSW Government Submission to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity Review Draft Report

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Introduction

The NSW Government welcomes the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) Draft Review. The review provides an excellent opportunity for Commonwealth, state and territory Governments to collaborate to create a revised and improved IGAB agreement in consultation with stakeholders, and supported by the discussion and recommendations put forward by the Review Panel.

The existing Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity established an effective framework to protect our national economy, environment and communities from biosecurity risks and the negative impacts they cause. IGAB provides a strong basis on which to draft a new agreement that enhances Australia's biosecurity system and strengthens collaboration amongst jurisdictions.

While NSW supports the overall focus of the review and the majority of its recommendations, there are aspects that NSW considers should be highlighted further and some areas where NSW requests the Review Panel reconsider its recommendations.

The NSW Government is in the process of undertaking a major reform of the NSW biosecurity system. The NSW reform process was initiated in recognition that biosecurity risk exposure is increasing and the need to safeguard our industries, environment and communities is becoming more vital.

The NSW biosecurity reforms are based on the principle that biosecurity is a shared responsibility between governments, industries and individuals. The NSW Government passed the new *Biosecurity Act (NSW)* (the Act) in 2015. The general biosecurity duty established under the Act operationalises this principle. The general biosecurity duty places a responsibility on any person who deals with biosecurity matter to ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable, any biosecurity risk the matter poses is prevented, eliminated or minimised. The new *Biosecurity Act 2015 (NSW)* and its supporting regulation will come into effect in 2017 and will give NSW the essential regulatory tools and powers to manage pests, diseases, weeds and contaminants and minimise biosecurity threats on the NSW economy, environment and community.

Key comments

The shared responsibility principle underpins effective biosecurity risk management

NSW notes that since IGAB came into effect in 2012 there has been an increasing focus on biosecurity being a shared responsibility. While shared responsibility is recognised in IGAB, NSW considers that the Final Report should include more discussion on how to deliver on this principle. For example, by highlighting that all stakeholders have a role and responsibility to manage biosecurity risk and by seeking to establish a better process for all stakeholders to contribute to the resourcing of the biosecurity system.

Clear and accountable roles and responsibilities are fundamental

IGAB currently provides an initial framework that allows governments to manage their roles and responsibilities within the national biosecurity system. The Review generally confirms that the IGAB has delivered on its aims of building and maintaining effective partnerships between jurisdictions to successfully plan for and manage positive biosecurity outcomes. IGAB2 should aim to further clarify the roles and responsibilities of government, industry and communities within a partnership approach that promotes biosecurity as a shared responsibility.

The suggestions made in some submissions that one area or another, for example market access or the environment, are not adequately covered by IGAB appears not to take appropriate account of

the biosecurity framework applied in IGAB. NSW regards these stakeholder concerns as reflecting a failure to understand the definition of 'biosecurity' in the Australian context. NSW views these concerns as reflective of shortcomings in the effective delivery of biosecurity rather than as fundamental deficiencies in the agreement itself. Such concerns also support the need for an ongoing whole of community communication and education program accompanied by overarching documents such as a Statement of Intent and a National Biosecurity Strategy. NSW supports the new IGAB providing formalised whole-of-government biosecurity arrangements within all jurisdictions, including by developing Memoranda of Understanding which further define jurisdictions' core commitments under the national system.

NSW believes that these commitments are already defined in an outcomes based format in the National Animal Health Performance Standards and National Plant Health Performance Standards as part of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), and that these agreements should be drawn upon.

Biosecurity risks need to be better communicated and the community better engaged

NSW considers that the Review should make a recommendation to deliver a national communication and education program that informs the Australian population about biosecurity risks and communicates the roles and responsibilities of government, industry and communities. The program should share biosecurity success stories, as well as educate the community on the risks posed by new incursions.

A concentrated and harmonised effort to promote biosecurity messages and principles will improve the community's understanding and appreciation of biosecurity in the Australian context. Taking action to ensure that stakeholders are informed and engaged with biosecurity is critical to safeguarding Australia's biosecurity future.

Communication and engagement needs to be incorporated as a strategic focus of the IGAB, as well as in the Statement of Intent (Sol) and the National Biosecurity Strategy (NBS). An ongoing whole of community communication and education program should be accompanied and supported by these overarching strategic documents.

Environmental biosecurity needs to be better incorporated within the national system

NSW is strongly aware of the need for greater involvement by government environmental agencies at Commonwealth, state and territory levels in the planning, resourcing and implementation of biosecurity management and a need to formalise these arrangements.

NSW supports the Review's efforts to better incorporate the environmental sector and environmental considerations into the national biosecurity system. Environmental agencies must play a far stronger and direct role in the development of national biosecurity policy and in response arrangements, particularly in those situations where the primary impact of a newly introduced pest or disease is environmental. Environmental agencies need to regard themselves as an integral part of the national biosecurity system and work with primary industry and agricultural departments, who have primary responsibility for biosecurity coordination.

NSW regards the creation of a Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer position within the Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy as a useful step towards improved national coordination of responses to pest and disease outbreaks as long as the role and its functions are sufficiently resourced. However, environmental considerations, in conjunction with agricultural considerations, should continue to be addressed by existing sectoral committees rather than through a separate committee process as the Draft Report proposes.

IGAB2 should set the strategic vision and facilitate an adaptive approach

NSW views the development of an overarching National Statement of Intent on Biosecurity and a

National Biosecurity Strategy as important documents for setting a strategic national vision for biosecurity risk management. Setting a strategic vision that is adaptive and responsive will enable resources to be prioritised to their most effective and efficient use. These strategic documents would also provide high-level guidance to other biosecurity-related agreements, policies and documents, including the IGAB.

The Draft Report identifies its central theme as the need to adopt a systematic approach to determining national biosecurity priorities that build the national system from the ground up, pest by pest, disease by disease. NSW supports a ground-up approach noting that concentrating on individual pests or diseases will help to capture stakeholders' attention, however, it is equally important to recognise that the strength of a national biosecurity system is in building a consistent yet adaptive approach to addressing the risks posed by the range of pests, diseases, weeds and contaminants.

NSW believes that IGAB2 should focus on setting out jurisdictions' commitments and should not be descriptive or set specific tasks. NSW strongly believes that the Final Report should focus on assessing the effectiveness of IGAB, and make clear recommendations on the drafting of IGAB2, and that any discussion and recommendations on the design and delivery of the schedules be discussed separately.

NSW notes that it is important that stakeholders recognise their biosecurity responsibilities and are engaged and involved in decision-making. Stakeholder involvement should drive improved biosecurity outcomes.

NSW notes that many submissions from non-government stakeholders requested more involvement in biosecurity decision making, whilst also expressing the view that the majority of responsibility, including resourcing, belongs to government. NSW would like the Final Report to point out that, for non-government stakeholders to have more input, they also need to recognise that they have responsibility for much of the biosecurity system. NSW supports non-government stakeholders having a larger input into decision making, provided there is an increased commitment to the provision and coordination of resources within a nationally agreed strategy.

There is an ongoing need to engage with industry through Animal Health Australia, Plant Health Australia and other forums, and with the rest of the community to ensure informed and transparent decision-making processes and to provide transparency about the decisions that are taken. The Draft Report's recommendation to establish an Industry and Community Advisory Committee (ICAC) is a positive step which NSW fully supports. The Draft Report's recognition of the importance of monitoring and evaluation is also welcome. Incorporating a commitment to improve monitoring and evaluation in IGAB2 would be a significant positive step.

IGAB should promote a work program that encourages continuous improvement

The first IGAB work program concentrated on developing frameworks for cross-sectoral implementation. The next phase of the work program needs to ensure that these frameworks are finalised and implemented, and identify where any additional frameworks and strategies are needed. Focussing on individual pests and diseases in the context of nationally agreed frameworks should assist the implementation task. There should be no conflict in adopting a whole-of-systems approach while at the same time focusing on individual pests or diseases.

Funding needs to be more secure and sustainable and better allocated

Secure and sustainable funding arrangements that direct funds to activities that deliver the highest return on investment is critical to safeguarding Australia's biosecurity future. NSW requests that the Final Report include further discussion on securing a sustainable national funding framework for biosecurity, and in particular consider funding sources to fund responses to new incursions that have environmental impacts.

The Draft Report notes that the level of funding required is likely to increase if the Review's recommendations are implemented. NSW notes that there is an existing funding gap for environmental biosecurity responses, whereas those risks that have agricultural impacts are better addressed by existing funding arrangements.

While the establishment of new positions and committees will inevitably incur a cost, there is an opportunity to increase the efficiency of processes and systems and improve the targeting of resources to increase cost effectiveness. There is also an opportunity for additional stakeholders to make investments and for government funds to be directed to those activities that government is more effective in delivering.

More investment by non-government stakeholders will free up government funds to focus on the prevention and eradication areas of the invasion curve where government has the most effective influence (the left hand side of the invasion curve (see Figure 8 in the Draft Report). Governments need to continue to recognise that although there are substantial benefits in investing in the left hand side of the curve there are also instances where investment in asset protection and the right hand side of the curve is appropriate, particularly for individual farmers and the community. This does not mean that industry and individuals shouldn't be encouraged to invest in prevention and eradication activities where specific pests or diseases impact on them directly. Industry needs to recognise that investment in prevention, eradication and containment will reduce the need to invest in asset based protection activities (the right hand side of the invasion curve) in the longer term.

The national biosecurity system needs to be supported by additional deeds and agreements

NSW notes that there is a need for additional deeds and agreements to be developed. These documents should be drafted in consultation with non-government entities and the community.

Much of the content of the present IGAB could be included within the new Sol. It is also important to develop a National Biosecurity Strategy in collaboration with stakeholders. Each jurisdiction should then develop its own biosecurity strategy that outlines the jurisdiction's role in implementing the national strategy. Business plans and annual operational plans would be informed by and support these strategies.

Performance reviews and auditing processes need to be strengthened

NSW shares the Review's concern that performance reviews and audits have been relatively rare and insufficient to date. The NBC has recognised the difficulties experienced in auditing against existing standards and has recently developed the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA) self-assessment and peer review process. NSW requests that the Review Panel consider this mechanism as an auditing and performance measurement option that could be adopted across the national biosecurity system.

Feedback requests

Feedback request 1: The Review Panel seeks feedback on the draft roles and responsibilities of national biosecurity system participants.

COMMENT:

In general terms the Review could examine opportunities for the Australian Government to divert funds currently spent on service delivery to instead increase the capability and capacity of states and territories. This could occur, for example, by redirecting funds the Commonwealth Government currently provides to the Northern Australian Quarantine Service. Supporting states and territories to provide services, rather than creating duplicate Commonwealth services or developing alternative Commonwealth governance and management systems, would be a more efficient and effective use

of funds.

The principle of the Australian Government '*providing national leadership for strategic biosecurity issues, including responses to exotic pests and diseases and management of nationally significant established pests and diseases*' needs to be better described. It would be useful to define what is meant by leadership in this context. It should also be recognised that where there is a need for national leadership this does not have to be confined to being provided by the Australian Government. Whoever provides the leadership must also recognise that this involves consulting with other stakeholders where decisions and investments of substance and importance are to be made.

NSW recommends that the Draft roles and responsibilities table (Table 1 of the Draft Report) be amended to:

- Note the role of AGSOC and AGMIN in setting national biosecurity policy with input from other stakeholders
- Note the role of the Australian Government as providing national coordination of emergency responses, co-funding and setting Australian Government policy.
- Note the role of State governments in relation to international market trade and access as 'assisting in' rather than 'supporting' negotiations
- Note the role of States and territories as requiring the maintenance of capacity and capability to prepare for, detect, and respond to exotic pests and disease incursions.
- Better describe the role of local government in regard to local and regional incursion and response programs. In NSW Local Land Services (LLS) has a greater role than local government in managing local and regional incursion response programs and local government is more often involved in delivering State Government managed programs such as the Weed Action Plan implementation. However, this situation will be different across jurisdictions. In NSW there is a process for triaging responses that involves local government, however, overall policies are set at a State level and the operational response depends on its impact. The role of local government as an enforcing agency for pest management varies across jurisdictions. While local government and LLS have a role to provide input into state and national policy and operations, national representation should continue to be via the state governments.
- Identify national, state and regional roles for industry and NGOs.
- Describe the role of industry, the community and NGOs in policy development through lobbying and consultation activities.
- Specifically refer to the roles and responsibilities of the AHA and PHA.

Feedback request 2: The Review Panel seeks feedback on the total effort and costs associated with demonstrating area freedom by jurisdictions, and the value of that trade.

COMMENT:

The use of areas of freedom or zones is a legitimate method of controlling or containing biosecurity threats. However, their use needs to be consistent with national and international agreements and expectations and also be the most cost beneficial option for all parties.

NSW's preferred position is not to use areas of freedom unless there are demonstrated market failures that can only be overcome by government regulation. NSW notes that in many cases the use of market forces to ensure freedom will be more cost effective and advantageous for all involved.

As an example, Victoria's insistence on having Queensland Fruit Fly (QFF) restrictions in place imposed significant costs on NSW and Queensland producers and also imposed significant costs on the Victorian government to keep them in place. Up to the time that Victoria reduced their QFF regulation, it was costing the NSW government in excess of \$4.5 million and the Victorian

Government in excess of \$7 million per annum. Additional costs were also imposed on NSW industry to meet requirements, such as dipping fruit with chemicals, storage costs, and loss of shelf life. The Victorian Government now requires that fruit is free of QFF and places responsibility on producers to meet this requirement as they see fit. The Victorian Government still incurs some costs, for example for inspections, and they continue to support a 'free zone' in the Sunraysia district. In NSW compliance is market driven, not regulatory driven, and QFF free fruit not subject to regulation is available at Sydney markets.

Feedback request 3: The Review Panel seeks feedback on the following options for a new entity for cross-sectoral biosecurity R&I:

Option 1: Establishing a new stand-alone entity for cross-sectoral biosecurity R&I.

Option 2: Addressing cross-sectoral biosecurity R&I within an existing RDC (for example, the Rural Industries RDC).

The Panel also seeks feedback on the funding options and would welcome alternative suggestions.

COMMENT:

National research, development and extension (RD&E) strategies are currently set up to align to production sectors, with some sectors allocating funds for biosecurity research. Research and development corporations are not currently uniformly investing in biosecurity research. Before determining whether a new cross-sectoral biosecurity research and innovation (R&I) entity is required, further investigation needs to be undertaken to determine why R&I entities do not appear to prioritise biosecurity-related research.

NSW believes that there is a failure on the part of many industry research bodies to recognise the importance of biosecurity research and that it is in the national interest to stipulate that a minimum percentage of research dollars be spent on national biosecurity research, for example, 20 per cent of levies. A cross-sectoral coordinating body could be established to identify research funding priorities to help determine where biosecurity research funding should be spent.

The NSW position on the options proposed in the Draft Report are as follows:

Option 1: Supported in principle but not the preferred option. The creation of a single new entity for cross-sectoral biosecurity research and innovation (R&I) could help to prioritise cross-sectoral biosecurity research funding. However, this option is not preferred as it would require new bodies to be established with associated costs, which would divert funds from research activities.

Option 2: Supported in Principle but not the preferred option. An advantage of this option is that it utilises an existing RDC, but expands its scope. A disadvantage of this option is that an existing RDC may have preconceived positions and focus. NSW support for Option 2 is premised on allocating funds specifically to biosecurity research activities.

The NSW preferred option is as follows:

Proposed Option 3: Requiring a minimum percentage (~20%) of national industry research levies to be allocated to biosecurity research activities, including to cross-sectoral biosecurity research, with AHA and PHA being made responsible for brokering the prioritisation of biosecurity research and funding within their sectors, as well as across their sectors. AHA and PHA are presently responsible for the development of the national animal and plant biosecurity RD&E strategies but they have no control of funds collected for research. Therefore, AHA and PHA, as companies jointly owned by government and industry, are ideally suited to this task. Because AHA and PHA are established bodies, the additional governance and administrative costs involved would be minimised, which would help to ensure that the majority of funds are available for research.

Feedback request 4: The Review Panel seeks feedback on the proposed Terms of Reference for the NBC.

COMMENT:

NSW has the following comments on the proposed terms of reference (ToRs):

- The ToRs should refer to the Sol, which should be in place before IGAB2 is enacted.
- The Chair position should be open to jurisdictions as well as the Australian Government on a rotating basis.
- The Australian Government should continue to manage the secretariat.
- The NBC should provide advice to AGSOC as well as AGMIN, noting that AGSOC is not mentioned in the proposed ToRs.
- It is unclear how the NBC can '*ensure effective national biosecurity capability is maintained*'. The NBC can monitor capability but it cannot ensure that jurisdictions are appropriately resourced. NSW suggests that the NEBRA self-assessment and peer review approach be drawn upon.
- NSW is unsure how the NBC can 'coordinate' investment, given that investment decisions are managed by jurisdictions. The NBC can continue to provide leadership and information to members on investment options but has limited capacity to determine how money is spent.
- Sectoral committees are needed in the IGAB TORs. However, NSW is not supportive of nominating specific sub-committees or working groups in the TORs. Sub-committees and working groups should be set up on a time limited basis as determined by NBC priorities. NSW would like to see the governance structure for the sectoral committees described in the ToRs.
- The introduction of a monitoring and evaluation framework is an important advance and NSW fully supports its inclusion in the ToR. NSW supports a self-assessment peer review process as a component of the M&E program.
- The role of the NBC in the coordination and sharing of information systems to support biosecurity outcomes is fully supported for inclusion in the ToR.

Feedback request 5: The Review Panel seeks feedback on the following options to ensure a more rapid response to an exotic pest or disease incursion:

Option 1: Cost-sharing arrangements should provide for four weeks of monitoring, assessment and preliminary control strategies, while an overall assessment is conducted on the possibility of successful eradication.

Option 2: Cost-sharing arrangements should include a default funding arrangement for when decisions cannot be quickly reached about the success or otherwise of an eradication program.

COMMENT:

The NSW position on the options proposed in the Draft Report are as follows:

Option 1 is not supported: Providing a rapid response to an incursion is part of a jurisdiction's existing commitments. Option 1 will act to remove the driver to resolve matters rapidly, and would also result in financial liabilities being incurred by other parties before an agreement is reached on the eradicability of the pest or disease. An interim response plan option is already available in the NEBRA and EPPRD agreements. If Option 1 is pursued, the wording applied in the NEBRA would be appropriate to use. Notably, the National Management Group (NMG) is able to agree to any actions that they think are appropriate to service the situation.

Option 2 is not supported: NSW regards this option as posing a risk and potential impediment to

implementing an immediate response. Option 2 will act to remove the driver to resolve matters rapidly, and would potentially draw out responses and decision making processes. Option 2 may also result in further financial liabilities being incurred.

Comments on recommendations

CHAPTER 2: KNOWING AND OWNING OUR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Recommendation 1: The NBC and the proposed Industry and Community Advisory Committee, through an open, transparent and collaborative process, should lead the development of a draft National Statement of Intent for public consultation that outlines:

- a vision, goal and objectives for the national biosecurity system
- principles for managing biosecurity
- the meaning and application of 'shared responsibility'
- the roles, responsibilities and commitments of participants, including accountability measures
- governance arrangements for the national biosecurity system.
- The process should involve government (including local government), industry and the community.

COMMENT: Supported.

NSW strongly supports the development of a National Statement of Intent (Sol) and a National Biosecurity Strategy (NBS) to provide an overarching framework for the delivery of the national system. NSW believes that there is a clear leadership role at the national level to provide strong communication and engagement of the vision, goals and objectives of the biosecurity system. NSW notes that there has been a lack of concentrated and harmonised effort to date to promote the key messages and principles of our national biosecurity system, and that improved engagement and communication is needed to drive cultural change.

The NBS and the Sol should provide overarching support and a systematic robust framework to drive Government, industry and stakeholder engagement and to provide consistent communication.

NSW notes that the Report could be clearer about how development of the Sol is to be achieved, including by specifying who should be responsible for its development and outlining a plan to progress its development.

NSW would like to see industry and non-government organisations, especially environmental stakeholders, taking a stronger role in communicating with stakeholders about biosecurity. An improved mechanism to publicise NBC achievements and decisions is necessary and will help increase stakeholder confidence in the NBC. The establishment of a community advisory committee as a subcommittee of the NBC is a positive step that will potentially contribute to overcoming current shortfalls in communication and understanding.

In general, NSW believes that developing a coherent and well communicated message about biosecurity and stakeholder roles and responsibility is required. Currently there is little industry leadership to promote the development and operation of national engagement programs. Notably, Victoria, NSW and Queensland are directing resources into state engagement programs. However, there is a need for the Australian Government and non-government stakeholders to agree to jointly fund and deliver a national communications and engagement strategy.

NSW strongly recommends that a national biosecurity communications and engagement strategy be

developed, resourced and implemented by national biosecurity system partners to raise national awareness of the importance of biosecurity and of our shared roles and responsibilities.

NSW does not agree with the Draft Report statement that *'Participation is hindered by the dominant agricultural focus of biosecurity and a limited knowledge of community-level biosecurity risks, with the exception of international and domestic travellers and those responsible for on-farm biosecurity.'* Recent NSW research indicates that stakeholder knowledge of biosecurity risks can be limited. However, NSW does not consider that an agricultural focus is hindering participation given the interdependence of industry, the environment and community across the whole system. There is scope for the Review to offer guidance on future programs to increase understanding and improve engagement.

NSW agrees that there is a strong argument to involve relevant stakeholders in the decision and policy making processes related to biosecurity. However, being a participant also means taking responsibility and making commitments. Australian governments should provide greater opportunities for industry and other stakeholders to participate in policy setting and decision making. NSW requests that the Review Panel provide further guidance on how this could be achieved. The increasing role of industry in certification and auditing is an example of industry leadership and government support of such programs. It is also worth noting the significant role that Animal Health Australia (AHA) and Plant Health Australia (PHA) play in supporting industry to take up these challenges.

CHAPTER 3: MARKET ACCESS IS KEY

Recommendation 2: The Primary Industries Technical Market Access and Trade Development Task Group should seek to enhance engagement with industry to ensure that Australia's market access strategies are aligned appropriately through an agreed priority setting process, and that the degree of transparency and communication is carefully weighed against its level of risk to trade activities.

COMMENT: Supported.

NSW supports the Primary Industries Technical Market Access and Trade Development Task Group (PITMATD) taking on a stronger and more prominent role in setting market access priorities in consultation with industry and the NBC.

Recommendation 3: IGAB2 should strengthen consideration of market access requirements within the next NBC work program.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

NSW is of the strong view that NBC work plans should not be included as part of the IGAB itself. Work plans should be derived from the directions set by the Sol, NBS and IGAB in consultation with AgMIN, Ag SOC, industry and the community.

Market access and protecting animal and plant production from pest and disease risks are highlighted as the key components of managing biosecurity risks to the economy in IGAB 1 and should continue to be in any subsequent versions of IGAB, and in the Sol, the NBS and associated documents.

Biosecurity research and innovation priorities should be based on addressing market access related issues. NSW supports greater co-ordination of market research activities across jurisdictions and with industry. This should allow for better alignment with market access issues and potentially avoid duplication of effort. For example, co-ordination of the work being undertaken on irradiation to inform protocol negotiations needs better ongoing co-ordination to ensure that results are quickly

shared and expertise better utilised.

Recommendation 4: Jurisdictions' biosecurity surveillance activities should include pests and diseases that pose the greatest threat to our export markets.

COMMENT: Supported.

Surveillance is extremely resource intensive and stakeholders will increasingly be required to contribute to surveillance activity. Surveillance and diagnostics systems must be able to demonstrate surveillance of healthy animals and plants as well as examine, exclude or identify endemic, exotic or emerging pests and diseases in sick or infested animals and plants.

Equally, if we are to ensure that primary producers are prepared to report suspect exotic pests and diseases, primary producers need to be encouraged to investigate deaths and production losses. In order to cover 'exotics' there is a need to also look at 'endemics' both as a differential diagnosis and as a means of keeping farmers and other stakeholders engaged. If there is no demonstrable return for farmers in knowing what pests and diseases are present in their animals and how they should manage them, there is limited incentive to conduct routine surveillance. Ensuring primary producers have access to pest and disease investigation services for endemic or production related pests and diseases is also an important part of ensuring that they will report significant pests and diseases.

Recommendation 5: States and territories should utilise (or adapt) the dispute resolution process agreed by ministers in 2012 and include the key elements of that in IGAB2.

COMMENT: Not supported.

There has been no reason to escalate disputes during the time that IGAB has been in place. Therefore, it appears that the aim of having disputes settled at a lower level is currently working. The proposed alternative process is problematic in two areas:

1. Time frames as short as 2 months before referral do not account for the complexity of data gathering in some biosecurity areas.
2. The proposal for an independent arbitrator: Under current arrangements the Commonwealth fulfilled the role of independent arbitrator. NSW understands that Tasmania did not sign IGAB as they did not support the Commonwealth taking on this role. NSW requests the Panel recommend an entity other than the Commonwealth who might fill this role.

Recommendation 6: IGAB2 should clarify the roles and responsibilities of the parties with regard to international and domestic market access, including proof of area freedom.

COMMENT: Supported.

The Draft Report appears to recommend an increasing role for industry in decision making in relation to market access decisions taken by government. PITMATD is noted as playing a key role in shaping the trade policy framework and coordinating market access. However, the Report also notes a perceived disconnect between PITMATD and the NBC, and a lack of communication or involvement between non-government stakeholders and PITMAD.

The discussion about regional differences and area of freedom raises points about the benefits of area of freedom zones and cost apportionment. The use of areas of freedom or zones is a legitimate method of controlling or containing biosecurity threats. However, their use needs to be consistent with national and international agreements and expectations, as well as being the most cost beneficial option for all parties.

NSW's preferred position is not to use areas of freedom unless there are demonstrated market

failures that can only be overcome by government regulation. NSW notes that in many cases the use of market forces to ensure freedom will be more cost effective and advantageous for all involved.

CHAPTER 4: STRONGER ENVIRONMENTAL BIOSECURITY

Recommendation 7: IGAB2 should include an explicit commitment by jurisdictions to support financially, decisions agreed to under NEBRA, but look to put in place systems that ensure decisions are evidence-based and transparent, in keeping with best risk management principles, and that give confidence to governments and the community that funds are being committed wisely and appropriately.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

NSW supports decision making that is evidence based and transparent, in keeping with best risk management principles, and that gives confidence to governments, industry and the community that funds are being committed and spent appropriately. These are the principles under which decision-making regarding the activation of NEBRA is currently intended to occur.

It is worth noting that the IGAB also does not explicitly state that signatories will support financially EADRA or EPPRD responses. The EADRA, EPPRD and NEBRA support the IGAB but they are also stand-alone documents. Signing up to NEBRA was and should remain a separate process. For example, Tasmania has not signed IGAB but they are prepared to sign NEBRA. By signing NEBRA, Tasmania has committed to support NEBRA if a response cannot be supported through the EADRA or EPPRD, and if it meets the necessary requirements.

There is no evidence to suggest signatories will not honour their commitments. On the contrary, in practice NEBRA responses have been funded and decisions have been evidence based and in keeping with best risk management principles. If the successful operation of current arrangements is not generally apparent, then this appears to be largely a communications issue.

It is important that each jurisdiction have agreements in place within and across agencies that ensure our national commitments can be met. This issue is further addressed under recommendation 8.

It should also be recognised that most environmental NGOs will expect most if not all incursions to be acted upon and funded by government regardless of the risks or costs.

Recommendation 8: Jurisdictions should institute formal arrangements between agriculture and environment agencies to define the objectives of cooperation, leading and support roles, information flows, resources and deliverables. The Australian Government agriculture and environment departments should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding, modelled on those with health and immigration agencies.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

Each jurisdiction needs to develop formal arrangements between their primary industries (PI) and environmental agencies if they do not already have such arrangements in place.

NSW has a number of such agreements in place, for example, the NSW Biosecurity Strategy, the NSW Ministerial Biosecurity Advisory Committee, State Emergency Management Committee, emergency Functional Areas responsibilities, and DisPLAN. However, NSW also accepts that recent events in NSW such as the Bellinger River Turtle Deaths, the Port Botany RIFA responses and the development of the NSW Biosecurity Act (and underpinning legislation and regulations) have demonstrated the need for additional agreements between NSW DPI and other agencies including the NSW Office of the Environment and Heritage.

NSW recognises that in order to benefit from the lessons learnt from these incidents, arrangements to manage future incursions should and will be formally identified.

Recommendation 9: The IGAB should make clearer commitments to environmental biosecurity and include:

- the principle of ecologically sustainable development- **Not supported**
- acknowledgement of Australia’s international responsibilities under the Convention on Biological Diversity- **Supported in principle**
- a program of work to determine, plan and prepare for national priority pests and diseases impacting the environment and native species- **Supported in principle**
- a focus on environment and community as well as industry partnerships- **Supported in principle**
- invertebrate transmitted diseases as well animal diseases- **Supported in principle**

COMMENT:

NSW does not consider it necessary to have an additional reference to the principle of ecologically sustainable development in the IGAB. NSW believes that currently the IGAB adequately reflects environmental considerations, with the commitment to environmental protection by the parties clearly articulated throughout the deed.

The Review should instead better define what it means by environmental biosecurity. Biosecurity is defined as the protection of the economy, environment and community from the negative impacts of pests, diseases and weeds. IGAB Principle 4.1 (viii) states ‘Australia’s biosecurity arrangements must comply with its international rights and obligations’.

Pests and diseases already present within Australia often have primary industry, environmental and social impacts, and existing management programs address these aspects. Potential new pests and diseases will also have primary industry, environmental and social impacts, and existing arrangements are designed to address them.

NSW strongly supports being prepared to manage the primary industry, environmental and social impacts of new pests and diseases, but believes that this is most efficiently achieved through existing arrangements, rather than as a separate process.

NSW would support the introduction of mechanisms to ensure environmental agencies are aware and contribute to achieving environmental biosecurity. Creation of an Environmental Biosecurity Australia (EBA) entity at an equivalent level to AHC and PHC that reports to the NBC may be an option worth considering, as long as it is adequately resourced.

Also of note is that invertebrates are not currently excluded from the IGAB, and IGAB is explicit about including vectors.

Recommendation 10: The Australian Government should establish the senior, expert position of Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer within the environment department. A less preferred option is to house the position in the agriculture department. The position should report on the effectiveness of Australia’s environmental biosecurity arrangements and achievements. Reports should be made publicly available.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

NSW supports the establishment of a CEBO position within the Australian Government environment department as a good step to ensuring better coordination of outbreaks and nationally coordinated responses, as long as the role is adequately resourced.

There are potentially sound outcomes to be delivered from establishing this role within the

environment department, including the opportunity to better coordinate input from environmental agencies and stakeholders into decision making, and to improve resourcing and funding allocations. NSW does not support the Review's less preferred option of housing the position in the agriculture department.

Recommendation 11: The NBC should establish and resource a new Environmental Biosecurity Committee (EBC), comprising government and external environment biosecurity experts and representatives from both the animal and plant sectoral committees of the NBC, to support the role of the Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer. The role of the EBC should be reviewed following its work to prioritise national biosecurity risks impacting the environment.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

When the NBC was initially established, there was an Environmental Biosecurity Committee also established at the same sectoral level as the Animal Health Committee and the Plant Health Committee. However, after a period of approximately 2 years, the EBC was dissolved. NSW requests that the Review Panel investigate why this occurred and propose some possible solutions before establishing a new EBC. NSW reserves its support for this recommendation until such an investigation occurs and findings are communicated.

Recommendation 12: Greater and explicit roles should be developed for AHA and PHA in environmental biosecurity, instituted through amended constitutions and expanded board expertise.

COMMENT: Not supported at this time.

NSW proposes that the Review also consider establishing an Environmental Biosecurity Australia (EBA) body as a government and NGO partnership as an alternative option to broadening the roles of AHA and PHA.

A business case should be conducted that assesses the options of expanding the roles of AHA and PHA in environmental biosecurity and the option of establishing a stand-alone EBA. The business case should identify the environmental issues that need to be addressed, define the scope, membership, roles and responsibilities and resourcing required for each option, and identify a preferred option based on this evaluation.

Creation of an EBA comprising government and external environment biosecurity experts would provide the level of interaction required, as well as allow open discussions within and between the government and NGOs.

CHAPTER 5: BUILDING THE NATIONAL SYSTEM

Recommendation 13: Jurisdictions should adopt a systematic approach to determine and plan for national priority animal, plant and environmental pests and diseases. **Supported in principle**

Recommendation 14: The NBC should lead five-yearly national-level risk prioritisation for emerging animal, plant and environmental risks and pathways, in partnership with system participants, reporting to AGSOC and AGMIN. **Supported**

COMMENT:

The need for a harmonised national approach across the whole biosecurity spectrum should also be noted in this recommendation.

NSW agrees with the Review's recognition of the need to continue to develop and implement national plans to manage the risks of pest and disease. However, the Draft Report suggests that there is currently little evidence of a systematic approach. NSW does not consider this as a fair representation, given the wide scope of the various biosecurity response deeds and plans.

NSW suggests that communities need to be mentioned, along with jurisdictions and industries, when describing the work and priorities of the biosecurity system. NSW notes that national priorities for the invasive species sector are identified through the frameworks in place to classify pests and diseases and weeds as being of national significance. NSW supports the Review's description of priorities, planning principles and the role of sectoral committees and stakeholders.

CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH AND INNOVATION

Recommendation 15: The sectoral committees of the NBC, with the endorsement of the NBC, should develop an agreed set of National Biosecurity R&I Priorities, in consultation with system participants and in line with the agreed national priority pests and diseases. Priorities at a sectoral and cross-sectoral level need to be considered. The priorities should be developed within two years of the final IGAB review report, and should be reviewed every five years.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

National RD&E Cross Strategies to prioritise and co-ordinate Animal Biosecurity and Plant Biosecurity RD&E have been formulated by national working groups as part of the National Primary Industries RD&E Framework. These have been endorsed by the AGSOC Research and Innovation Committee. The addition of an NBC biosecurity representative to the Research and Innovation Committee could add value.

NSW recommends that AHA and PHA lead the development of a risk based R&I Strategy, in collaboration with sectoral committees and stakeholders. It is important that environmental biosecurity risks are properly captured within the Strategy. AHA and PHA could take on a coordination role in delivering and resourcing the Strategy and NBC should promote the Strategy and lead engagement activities. AHA and PHA should be responsible for recommending priorities, with the NBC taking the decision role in determining final R&I priorities. Reviews should be carried out more frequently than 5 years to ensure new trends are captured and innovation and research advances are utilised. The proposed EBA, or the AHA and PHA with an expanded environmental biosecurity role, could take on the role of coordinating environmental R&I.

CHAPTER 7: STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE

Recommendation 16: A future IGAB should remain an agreement between the First Ministers of the Australian, state and territory governments. **Supported**

Recommendation 17: First Ministers should, within IGAB2, identify lead ministers and agencies for biosecurity (assumed to be agriculture or primary industries) and require supporting whole-of-government arrangements to be in place, including through memoranda of understanding.

Supported

Recommendation 18: First Ministers should formally establish the NBC and articulate its Terms of Reference in the IGAB. **Supported**

Recommendation 19: The NBC should include the CEO of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), and the New Zealand Government be invited to include a representative.

Supported in part

COMMENT:

The NSW Biosecurity Strategy 2013-2021 acknowledges the Department of Primary Industries as the lead agency for biosecurity in NSW with supporting agencies including OEH and LLS.

NSW's whole of government approach to biosecurity and food safety, and its emergency management arrangements, as supported by the State Emergency Management Committee structure, are well regarded by other jurisdictions.

In relation to Recommendation 18, NSW is supportive of describing the NBC ToRs in IGAB with first Minister sign-off.

NSW does not support Recommendation 19 in relation to including the CEO of ALGA in the NBC. NSW considers that while local government plays an important role in managing biosecurity risk across Australia, the IGAB Review has not demonstrated any additional benefits of including a local government representative on the NBC.

NSW supports Recommendation 19 in relation to inviting a NZ Government representative to become a member of the NBC, subject to NZ being excluded from those parts of the meeting that may address sensitive Australian issues. New Zealand has similar biosecurity issues and concerns to Australia and has been pursuing a very similar biosecurity approach to Australia for some time; however, at times we are competitors. Excluding NZ from some discussions is accepted by both Australia and NZ as a suitable mechanism for managing such risks. NZ is a member of AGSOC and AHC and this practice is followed in these forums.

Recommendation 20: The NBC should adopt a sub-committee structure that aligns with the revised national biosecurity system objectives and national reform priorities in the IGAB. All NBC working groups and expert groups should be task-specific and, wherever possible, time-limited.

COMMENT: Supported in part.

NSW does not consider the Review to have fully articulated the roles and responsibilities of existing committees and sub-committees, or provided sufficient argument to justify the proposed deletion of the IPAC and the creation of an Environmental Biosecurity Committee.

The need for revised national biosecurity system objectives or reform priorities is yet to be agreed upon. It would therefore be premature to agree to changes to committee and sub-committee structures at this early stage.

NSW suggests that once the revised objectives and reform areas are agreed to, the NBC be made responsible for determining the committees and sub-committees necessary to achieve the required outcomes. NSW agrees that any new subcommittee structure requires strong governance, and needs to be time limited and project and outcome specific. The subcommittees should recruit participants with suitable expertise, skills and knowledge, rather than recruit from specific functional work areas.

Recommendation 21: The NBC should take steps to increase its public profile and openness, including establishing a stand-alone website. The website could be maintained by, but be separate from, the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, and could accommodate and centralise all information on the NBC, its committees, and their activities. Key policy frameworks, agreements and reports of the NBC should be made publicly available on the site.

COMMENT: Supported.

NSW strongly supports the maintenance of a website that allows public access to as much information as possible on biosecurity and the activities of the NBC and its committees, sub-committees and working groups.

The NBC should take steps to increase its public profile and openness, including by examining the potential to develop a standalone website, if this is determined to be effective. Notably, improvements in communication, transparency and content could also be achieved within the current website. The current website provides people with information in the one place and explains the context of the NBC in relation to government. A standalone NBC website could give the appearance that the NBC is a stand-alone organisation rather than a government committee. The resources required for an additional website could instead be redirected to a larger communications and branding campaign that engages with industry stakeholders and the broader community.

Recommendation 22: AGSOC should establish and provide oversight to an independent IGAB Evaluation Program to assess and report on implementation of each jurisdiction's commitments under the IGAB. The evaluations, or a summary of them, should be made publicly available following ministerial consideration. **Supported in part**

Recommendation 23: The NBC should clarify core commitments of jurisdictions for use in the independent IGAB Evaluation Program to be documented in a future IGAB. **Supported**

Recommendation 24: The NBC should report annually to AGMIN on its progress of priority reform areas. The NBC's work program and annual report should be made publicly available upon ministerial consideration. **Supported**

COMMENT:

In relation to Recommendation 22, NSW requests that the Review Panel consider a self-auditing/peer review performance measurement option that provides an ongoing independent audit process.

NSW notes that the NBC, in recognition of the difficulties experienced in auditing against the existing standards, has recently developed the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA) self-assessment and peer review process as an alternative auditing mechanism. It would appear from the Draft Report that the Review Panel is unaware of the self-assessment and peer review process.

Presently, EADRA, EPPRD and NEBRA jurisdictions and industry signatories are required to be able to demonstrate that they can meet their obligations under these agreements. National animal and plant health performance standards have been developed to support this, with AHA and PHA managing the auditing process. However, this approach has generally failed to provide the data necessary to reassure all signatories that obligations are being met.

Recently a working group was established under the IGAB to look at alternative ways of developing a performance framework, measures and auditing process for NEBRA in the hope that this might be able to be expanded to cover related deeds and the IGAB. This system is based around a self-assessment and a peer review process and has recently been trialled across Queensland, NSW and Victoria.

NSW considers that this system provides a useful evaluation model to assess and report on implementation of each jurisdiction's commitments under the IGAB that could be adopted across the national biosecurity system.

Recommendation 25: AGSOC should establish, as a priority, an Industry and Community Advisory Committee to provide advice to the NBC on key policies and reforms.

COMMENT: Supported.

NSW strongly supports the Review's recommendation to establish an Industry and Community Advisory Committee provided its role, function, structure and governance arrangements are clearly established.

It is important that this committee be made of representatives with strong expertise. In considering the membership of this committee and its roles and responsibilities, particular attention should be paid to how the members of this committee effectively represent stakeholders and how these groups interact with NBC sectoral and sub committees as well as the AHA, PHA and a possible future EBA. It would also be beneficial to have a representative from the indigenous community on the committee.

NSW's proposed national biosecurity communications and engagement strategy would enhance engagement and could also assist with drawing in new viewpoints and improving access to community and environmental stakeholders.

Recommendation 26: The NBC should convene a dedicated annual national Biosecurity Roundtable for AHA and PHA members to provide direct input to the NBC.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

NSW is concerned that the recommendation presupposes that the representation currently provided to the NBC by the AHA and PHA is not fully representing members' views. This is regarded as unlikely. AHA and PHA views on this matter would be welcome.

CHAPTER 8 FUNDING OUR NATIONAL SYSTEM

Recommendation 27: The NBC and the Industry and Community Advisory Committee, in consultation with other key stakeholders, should revise the National Framework for Cost Sharing Biosecurity Activities to enable its practical application.

COMMENT: Supported.

Recommendation 28: The NBC, with key industry and non-government partners, should agree uniform and fully inclusive categories of funding activity for the national biosecurity system.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

NSW seeks further clarification on this recommendation, with examples included. The recommendation appears to relate to the annual investment portfolio categories that are already being used. NSW agrees that there is a need to improve alignment of reported expenditure to the

categories as currently there is inconsistency in the approach taken by jurisdictions.

Recommendation 29: The IGAB should include an ongoing commitment to the funding stocktake, with governments publicly reporting their expenditure and the high-level stocktake results under uniform and fully inclusive categories.

COMMENT: Supported.

This activity has already been agreed and enacted by jurisdictions, and could be incorporated as part of the IGAB deed. There is also a need to request industries and NGOs to report their funding contributions.

Recommendation 30: All governments should review their current biosecurity expenditure, with a view to redirecting funding into areas that return the highest yields to farmers, industry and the community. This approach will require a planned and coordinated strategy of engagement and communication.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

Redirecting funding into areas that have the highest economic returns to farmers, industry and the community is not as simple as shifting expenditure to activities that are to the left of the invasion curve i.e. to prevention and eradication activities. While government does typically achieve higher returns to the left, there are exceptions. Investing in other sections of the curve will be appropriate for other stakeholders in the biosecurity community, for example, farmers directly spraying weeds, and environmental agencies protecting assets.

NSW notes that this recommendation should use the term 'returns' rather than yields. NSW agrees that putting in place a planned and coordinated strategy of research, engagement and communication is essential to ensuring that priorities are appropriately identified and funds are directed to the highest value activities. NSW looks forward to the Review articulating a strategic approach that can achieve this result.

Recommendation 31: The Risk Return Resource Allocation model should be extended to include all jurisdictions and their investments, with the Australian Government providing assistance to jurisdictions to build national capacity.

COMMENT: Not able to comment.

While Appendix D of the Draft Report goes some way in describing the Risk Return Resource Allocation Model used by Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, NSW's lack of access to the model precludes meaningful comment.

Recommendation 32: AHA and PHA should coordinate an industry stocktake of national biosecurity system investments, making the results publicly available.

COMMENT: Supported.

AHA and PHA currently map investment by their stakeholders and make information on where investment is targeted publically available.

Recommendation 33: The emergency response deeds for aquatic animals and exotic production weeds should be finalised within 12 months.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

NSW has been helping to drive the development of these deeds. NSW staff members have been participating on the NBC working groups overseeing the development of the deeds. In the case of the aquatic

NSW notes that the 12 month deadline should be possible for the development of the deed but is concerned that negotiations and agreement with potential industry signatories may extend the timeframe to longer than 12 months.

Recommendation 34: State and territory governments should review their biosecurity cost-recovery arrangements to ensure they are consistent, appropriate and transparent. **Supported**

Recommendation 35: All levels of government could help meet their budgetary challenges by reviewing biosecurity levies and rates/charges currently or potentially applying to system participants. These should be commensurate with agreed national cost sharing principles, which the Review Panel considers should be reviewed. **Supported in principle**

COMMENT:

NSW has reviewed its biosecurity cost-recovery arrangements as part of the development of the *Biosecurity Act NSW* and the regulatory impact statement process. The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal also reviewed funding arrangements as part of the process of establishing LLS.

Recommendation 35 is supported in principle in cases where jurisdictions have not recently undertaken relevant reviews.

NSW recommends that while a review is a necessary first step, the significant task is to implement arrangements that recover biosecurity resource contributions from stakeholders, including risk creators and beneficiaries. Jurisdictions also have the option of not seeking full cost recovery.

CHAPTER 9: MEASURING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

Recommendation 36: The NBC should establish a time-limited task group to progress development of a performance framework and performance measures for the national biosecurity system.

COMMENT: Supported.

NSW strongly supports the development of an IGAB driven performance measurement model which allows adjustments to be made where needed to tailor for sectoral needs.

Presently, under the EADRA and EPPRD, there are requirements for each of the jurisdictional and industry signatories to be able to demonstrate that they can meet their obligations under these agreements. National animal and plant health performance standards have been developed in order to be able to do this. However, their use for these purposes has been inconsistent. The present approach based on a sectoral emergency deed approach also means that if there is no deed or agreement, there are no performance standards or performance measures. For example, there are no emergency aquatic and weeds deeds currently in place and therefore there are also no performance frameworks in place for them.

NSW recommends that the IGAB Review Panel examine the Normal Commitments Maturity Matrix developed by the NEBRA Benchmarks working group, and the recently trialled self-audit and peer review process developed for the NBC as examples of high level performance monitoring systems that could be adapted and adopted as a component of the monitoring the performance program of the national biosecurity system.

Recommendation 37: The Australian Government should facilitate development of an integrated, national biosecurity information system to provide a common platform for all jurisdictions to share and access biosecurity data and information in the national interest.

COMMENT: Supported

Recommendation 38: Data and knowledge sharing should be a core commitment of jurisdictions under the IGAB. Minimum standards and specifications should be agreed for data sets.

COMMENT: Supported

NSW supports the development of an integrated national biosecurity information system that enables jurisdictions to access and share data and information.

The NSW is developing a Biosecurity Information System (BIS) to provide a centralised and common platform for the management of biosecurity information in NSW. The BIS has been designed to meet the current National Minimum Data Standards (NMDS). This capability has been tested as part of two separate desktop exercises conducted in 2013 and 2014 by Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry's Data Standards for National Reporting Biosecurity Policy Division.

The National Biosecurity Information Governance Expert Group (NBIGEG) as per IGAB requirements are working together to agree a data sharing protocol to augment the National Biosecurity Information Governance Agreement (NBIGA).

Recommendation 39: The Australian Government should establish, within the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, a dedicated National Biosecurity Intelligence Unit, to coordinate and provide advice to the NBC, AGSOC and AGMIN on biosecurity intelligence covering emerging risks and pathways, and international and domestic pest and disease detection.

COMMENT: Supported in principle.

The ability to see 'over the horizon' is essential to be able to predict and prepare for future biosecurity risks and threats. Rather than rely on the Australian Government alone, a national approach using a model similar to that used for other NBC working groups or task forces could be established that reports to the NBC. This would require either the Australian Government to provide a secretariat or the costs of the secretariat to be shared by jurisdictions with each jurisdiction providing a staff member to work on the national taskforce.

CHAPTER 10: A FUTURE SYSTEM, A FUTURE IGAB

Recommendation 40: Jurisdictions should adopt the proposed new priority reform areas and associated work program for IGAB2, and amend the IGAB in line with proposed revisions.

COMMENT: Not supported at this stage.

NSW is supportive of adopting an IGAB2. However, NSW has a number of concerns with the version of IGAB2 recommended by the Review, and reserves support subject to these concerns being addressed in the Review's Final Report.

NSW strongly supports the role of the IGAB to set out the framework of the national biosecurity system and clearly stating the outcomes that are required to be delivered by government.

NSW is supportive of the priority the Review places on governance issues. NSW views the national Sol and NBS as vehicles for articulating the responsibilities and accountabilities of government, industry and the community, as the three partners responsible for delivering biosecurity outcomes.

There is currently a lack of capacity to measure accountability in relation to the range of biosecurity deeds. The development of performance indicators to track government, industry and community performance in delivering on biosecurity outcomes would be a significant step forward. However, NSW does not support schedules being included in the IGAB, principally because these documents need to be fluid and, if included, there are restrictions on how easily they can be updated. The IGAB should also not include mention of priority work areas. Work priorities are to be formulated by the NBC and they are also subject to change, and need to be fluid. This recommendation is also not consistent with Table 12, which outlines 4 proposed Schedules which do not include work plans for the NBC.

NSW believes the current IGAB has achieved positive outcomes for biosecurity in Australia. There is scope in the Draft Report to expand on the achievements made by IGAB to date and to identify where improvements should be made to improve identified shortcomings. Stakeholder feedback cited in the Review tends to be critical of the lack of involvement by industry in IGAB's development. However, it is reasonable for an intergovernmental agreement to be development by governments given they are the signatories of the agreement. The Review should highlight that industry involvement was integral to the development of other biosecurity response deeds.

NSW suggests that the Draft Report could be clearer on the transition to management and the ongoing management aspects of the response deeds, and be less focussed on the emergency response component. This would reflect the fact that jurisdictions have a broad role and a range of existing commitments across the invasion curve. Along with government, stakeholders also have clear roles and responsibilities along the invasion curve. Notably, landholders tend to focus on the right hand side of the invasion curve, and governments are increasingly moving investment towards prioritising activities on the left hand side.

NSW is fully supportive of the Review's proposed NBC work program and the output of *'greater landowner-led resourcing and management of nationally significant established pests and diseases'* and would like to see this approach be given more prominence in the discussion in regard to investments across the invasion curve.